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TADBIR URUS KORPORAT DAN KUALITI PERAKAUNAN DI  
MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Malaysia menghadapi persaingan dari negara-negara di rantau ini dan dari negara-
negara sedang membangun seperti India dan China dalam menarik pelabur. Bukan 
sahaja sumber-sumber semula jadi, kualiti tenaga kerja dan kestabilan politik yang 
menarik pelabur ke negara kita. Kualiti perakaunan, kebolehpercayaan, ketelusan dan 
tadbir urus korporat turut sama penting. Oleh itu, objektif utama kajian ini adalah 
untuk mengkaji perubahan dalam kualiti perakaunan sebelum dan selepas 
pelaksanaan Piawaian Laporan Kewangan (FRS) pada 1 Januari, 2006. Kajian ini 
juga mengkaji hubungan antara pelbagai mekanisme tadbir urus struktur lembaga, 
jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti perakaunan di Malaysia. Kajian ini akan 
menggunakan data semua syarikat awam yang tersenarai di papan utama (PLC) dari 
tahun 2003-2008 sebagai populasi untuk mendapatkan sampel. Data yang lengkap 
daripada 397 syarikat bukan kewangan telah terkumpul untuk kajian ini. Keputusan 
menunjukkan bahawa kualiti perakaunan telah merosot dari pengurusan perolehan 
yang lehih tinggi dan pengurangan pegiktirafan kerugian untuk jangka masa selepas 
perlaksanaan jawatan Standard Pelaporan Kewangan Antarabangsa (IFRS) dan Kod 
Tadbir Urus Korporat (MCCG). Tambahan pula, keputusan juga menunjukkan 
bahawa ciri-ciri tadbir urus korporat seperti kepakaran urus tadbir dalam 
jawatankuasa lembaga, saiz lembaga, pemilikan saham, peranan berbelah pengarah 
atau kebebasan pengerusi, kepakaran kewangan jawatankuasa audit, kebebasan 
jawatankuasa audit sangat berkaitan dengan kualiti perakaunan dalam tempoh 
selepas perlaksanaan IFRS dan MCCG. Keputusan boleh digunakan oleh peserta 
pasaran saham dalam membuat penilaian terhadap peranan tadbir urus korporat dan 
struktur pemilikan dalam meningkatkan kualiti pendapatan dilaporkan. Hasil kajian 
juga akan membantu penguatkuasa untuk menentukan sifat-sifat tadbir urus korporat 
yang berkesan dan menilai keperluan dalam pendedahan amalan tadbir urus korporat 
pada masa depan.  
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING QUALITY IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Malaysia faces increased competition from countries in the region and from 
emerging economies such as India and China in attracting investors. It is not just the 
natural resources, quality of labour force and political stability that attract investors 
to its shores. Equally important is the accounting quality, its reliability, transparency 
and corporate governance. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to 
examine the changes in accounting quality before and after the implementation of 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) on January 1, 2006. This research also 
examines the relationship between various governance mechanisms of board 
structure, audit committees and accounting quality in Malaysia. This study will be 
conducted by using the entire main board public-listed companies (PLCs) as 
population for the year of 2003 to 2008 in order to obtain the sufficient samples for 
analysis. The final sample for this study comprised 397 non-financial companies 
with complete data for accounting quality and corporate governance variable. The 
overall results in this study find that accounting quality has reduced in terms of 
higher earnings management and lesser timely loss recognition during the post IFRS 
and post MCCG period. Furthermore, the results also suggest that corporate 
governance attributes of governance expertise in board committee, directors’ 
ownership, role duality or chairman independence, audit committee financial 
expertise, audit committee independence are associated at significant levels with 
accounting quality during the post IFRS and post MCCG period. Its results are 
useable by stock market participants in their evaluation of the roles of corporate 
governance and ownership structure in enhancing the quality of reported earnings. 
The findings will also help regulators to define effective corporate governance 
attributes and to assess the requirements for disclosure of corporate governance 
practices in future. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction  
This research examines the relationship between various governance mechanisms of 
– board structure, audit committees and accounting quality – in Malaysia. The 
chapter is organisedorganized as follows: Section 1.1 explains the background of the 
research and Section 1.2 discusses the problem statement. Section 1.3 provides 
justifications for the research objectives while Section 1.4 develops the research 
questions. Section 1.5 explains the significance of this research, and, finally, Section 
1.6 concludes the chapter by summarisingsummarizing the organisationorganization 
of the thesis.  
 
 
1.1 Background of the research 
The International Accounting Standards Board (hereafter, IASB) is   the 
independent,  accounting standard-setting body of the the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (thereafter IFRS) Foundation. The IASB was founded on April 
1, 2001 as the successor to the the International Accounting Standards 
Committee International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).  
Stemming from the IASB’s plan to produce a single set of high-quality global 
reporting standards and thereby eliminating eliminate incomparability, the new 
implementation of IFRS is aimeds at achieving convergence in the world of 
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: Vertical Alignment: Justified,
Width:  21 cm, Height:  29.7 cm, Footer
distance from edge:  0.96 cm
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: Font: 12 pt, English (U.S.)
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
Formatted: Font: 12 pt, English (U.S.)
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
Formatted: Font: 12 pt, English (U.S.)
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
Formatted: Font: 12 pt, English (U.S.)
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
Formatted: Font: 12 pt, English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
2 
accounting (Lazar et al., 2006). To date, more than 100 countries have agreed to 
require, or allow adoption of IFRS (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Improved 
accounting quality will reduce information asymmetry by disclosing relevant and 
timely information , which will  and this would enable global comparisons of 
financial statements, increase transparency and boost investor confidence in the 
marketplace (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007).1 
Malaysia is also eyeing for full convergence with IFRS by 2012. As we are aware, 
Malaysia faces increased competition from countries in the region and from 
emerging economies, such as India and China, in attracting investors. It is not just the 
natural resources, quality of labourlabor force and political stability that attract 
investors to its shores. Equally important is the accounting quality, its reliability, 
transparency and corporate governance (Lazar et al., 2006). Therefore, the 
accounting standards need to be changed to best adapt to the demands of the 
continuously evolving environment. And  In addition, there is a growing consensus 
around the world that financial reporting quality in any marketplace should be of 
high accounting quality in order to serve the needs of investors and facilitate the 
achievement of an effective global market (Lazar et al., 2006). The following section 
will discuss accounting quality, and, thereafter, corporate governance in more detail.      
 
1.1.1 Accounting quality 
                                                 
1 This research adopts the accounting standards perspective of accounting quality.  This perspective 
was defined by Barth et al. (2007), who states that “… higher accounting quality will exhibit less 
earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and higher value relevance.”  
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Consistent with the predictions in this prior research, higher  accounting quality  
exhibits less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and higher value 
relevance of earnings and equity book value (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008, 
Barth et al.,2010). Since this research only using multivariate analysesFollowing 
prior research, therefore it this research also operationalisesoperationalizes 
accounting quality using earnings management and , timely loss recognition, and 
value relevance metrics. These twohree aspects are especially relevant to the research 
question because accounting quality can also be affected by opportunistic discretion 
exercised by managers, and, are therefore, is likely to be influenced by the incentives 
of those who prepare the financial statement  rather than changes in the accounting 
standards . The incentives are even higher for a developing country like Malaysia, 
that which has different institutional characteristics, and in which and where the legal 
protection of outside investors is weak, and, thushence, the accounting quality is 
questionable. The following section with will discussion the twohree accounting 
quality metrics. 
 
1.1.1.1 Earnings management 
Earnings management has been defined by Healy and Wahlen (1999) as:  
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.  
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Similarly, Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as: a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain.  
IFRS may limit management opportunistic discretions by reducing available 
accounting alternatives.    Hence,  IFRS earnings to will be less managed than 
domestic based earnings (which are MASB Standards) because IFRS limits 
management’s discretion to report earnings that are less reflective of the firm’s 
economic performance (Barth et al., 2010), and, therefore, accounting quality should 
increase. The following section will discuss timely loss recognition. 
 
1.1.1.2 Timely loss recognition  
Turning to timely loss recognition, this research assumed assumes that higher quality 
earnings exhibit a higher frequency of large losses. This is consistent with Basu 
(1997), Basu Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000), Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Watts (2003a, b),   Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 
2006) Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006), and Barth et al., (2010), that who suggest 
that one characteristic of higher quality earnings is that large losses are recognized as 
they occur rather than being deferred to future periods. This characteristic is closely 
related to earnings management in that if earnings are managed, large losses should 
be relatively rare. Thus, the firms applying IFRS report large losses with higher 
frequency than those applying domestic standards. 
Accounting quality is closely linked with to financial reporting and earnings quality. 
As mentioned, accounting quality usesing earnings management, timely loss 
recognition and value relevance as metrics.  Whereas, earnings quality using uses 
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5 
various measures to measure the quality of the earnings numbers. As such, 
accounting quality and earning quality are proxies’ for financial reporting quality, 
which is explained next.  
 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Financial reporting quality   
Jonas and Blanchet (2000) described the two general proxy proxies that are widely 
used in assessing financial reporting quality. The first proxy is based on the needs of 
users. Under this proxy, financial reporting quality is determined relative to the 
usefulness of the financial information to the users of the information. The Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) Conceptual Framework explains the 
qualitative characteristics that make financial; reporting information useful to users. 
These are the understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability. The second 
proxy of financial reporting quality is focussedfocuses on the notion of 
shareholder/investor protection. This proxy defines quality financial reporting as 
"full and transparent financial information that is not designed to obfuscate or 
mislead users" (Jonas and Blanchet, 2000). Consistent with this proxy, the Bursa 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) has a statutory obligation to ensure that 
their markets are fair, orderly and transparent.  There is a fundamental distinction 
between these two proxies of financial reporting quality. The user needs proxy is 
mainly concerned with providing relevant information to users for making decisions, 
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whereas the shareholder/investor protection proxy aims to ensure the information 
provided to users is sufficient for their needs, transparent and competent (Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000). In the next section, earnings quality will be discussed in more 
detail.    
 
 
1.1.3 Earnings quality  
 
A number of methods have been used in the research literature to empirically 
measure financial reporting quality. One broad method has been to use a variety of 
approaches to measure the quality of the earnings numbers reported in firms' 
financial reports. Under this method, the higher the quality of earnings, the higher is 
the overall financial reporting quality. As noted by Schipper and Vincent (2003), 
there is  neither a widely agreed meaning given to the term "earnings quality"2, nor a 
generally accepted approach to measuring this concept.  
There are two methods to measure earnings quality namely: .  The first method is the 
modified version of the Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals. This method 
                                                 
2 Earnings quality has been defined as "…the extent to which reported earnings faithfully represent 
Hicksian income." (Schipper and Vincent 2003). Hicksian income is:  
 
The amount that can be consumed (that is, paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the 
firm equally well off at the beginning and end of the period. (Schipper and Vincent 2003).  
 
The specific earnings quality constructs developed in this research are derived from the relations 
among income accruals and cash. Schipper and Vincent (2003) argued that the portion of accruals that 
is not manipulated and error free increases the extent to which accounting earnings faithfully 
represents Hicksian income. 
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has been widely used in the literature to capture earnings management (one of the 
proxy proxies for accounting quality, which is viewed as an inverse measure of 
earnings quality (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Teoh, 
Welch and Wong, 1998a; Francis, Maydew and Sparks, 1999; Kasznik, 1999; 
Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2001; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002; Frankel, Johnson and 
Nelson, 2002; Balsam, Krishnan and Yang, 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Gul, 
Chen and Tsui, 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Dowdell and Krishnan, 2004; Samarasekera et 
al., 2012).  
The above definitions take an opportunistic view of earnings management, whereby 
the intent of management is to obtain some private gain by misleading stakeholders 
or influencing contractual outcomes. Therefore, under this perspective, earnings 
management negatively impacts on the quality of earnings, i.e., the greater the 
earnings management, the lower the earnings quality and vice versa. If earnings were 
managed opportunistically, the reported earnings number and the overall financial 
reports would be of a lower quality. This relates to both perspectives of financial 
reporting quality from Jonas and Blanchet (2000), as opportunistic earnings 
management both decreases the usefulness of the financial information for users (the 
user needs perspective) and misleads users (the shareholder/investor protection 
perspective). An alternative view is that earnings are managed to allow managers to 
reveal more private information to users about the financial reports (Schipper 1989; 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Consequently, earnings management should be negatively 
associated with the information content of earnings. The association is empirically 
established in the literature (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Wang, 2006; Cheng et al., 2011). 
When managers manage earnings for opportunistic purposes, accounting earnings 
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
8 
become a less reliable measure of a firm’s financial performance. The less reliable 
earnings are the less informative and useful they become. 
The second method used to measure earnings quality is the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. This model argues that estimation errors in accruals, and, that 
subsequent corrections of these errors, decreases the quality of accruals and earnings. 
However, unlike the Jones (1991) type models of discretionary accruals that: focuses 
on the opportunistic use of accruals to window-dress and mislead users of financial 
statements, no attempt is made to separate the intentional from the unintentional 
accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). This is because both types of 
errors imply low quality accruals, and, therefore, earnings. Therefore, while the 
Jones (1991) model assumes that accruals and earnings quality is are only affected by 
management intent to manipulate, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of 
earnings quality incorporates both intentional and unintentional estimation errors in 
accruals. Intentional errors arise from the incentives to manage earnings and would 
be similar to the opportunistic earnings management proxy by the Jones (1991) 
model. Unintentional errors arise from management lapses and environmental 
uncertainty (Francis et al., 2009). The following section will discuss the relationship 
between corporate governance and accounting quality.  
 
1.1.4 Corporate governance and accounting quality  
Corporate governance as is defined by the Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance in Malaysia is as “the process and structure used to direct and manage 
the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and 
corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term 
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.), Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: English (U.S.), Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: English (U.S.), Not Highlight
9 
shareholder value, whilst taking account the interests of other stakeholders” (Report 
on Corporate Governance 1999). 
 
One of the most important functions that corporate governance can play is in 
ensuring high accounting quality (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2004; 
Fredersiksson et al., 2012). Based on agency theory, issues associated with the 
separation between ownership and control will lead managers (agents) to act in an 
opportunistic manner by increasing their personal wealth at the expense of the 
owners (principal) of an organisationorganization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  As 
financial statements provide value-relevant information to the external parties of the 
organisationorganization, the heavy reliance placed on accounting numbers create a 
powerful incentives for managers to manipulate earnings to their own advantage. The 
incentives for managers to manipulate reported earnings may be influenced by job 
security, contractual agreements between managers and the external stakeholders, 
self-interest in the presence of compensation schemes or the need to achieve target 
earnings and to meet market expectations (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). In these firms, 
failure to monitor the management may lead to inefficient resource allocation, and, to 
some extent, corporate scandals like Enron and Worldcom. These acts are often 
followed by non-transparent and misleading reporting to camouflage the effect of the 
scandals from becoming known by the shareholders (Johari, Salleh and Hassan, 
2008). Hence, it is crucial for an organization to have an effective corporate 
governance mechanism to safeguard the rights of the investors in getting the true and 
fair information of the company. 
The 1997 economic crisis in Malaysia has exposed serious weaknesses in the 
corporate governance practices, namely, weak financial structure, over-leveraging by 
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
10 
companies, lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability (Rahman and Ali, 
2006). Together with other recent high profile scandals as mentioned and some other 
firms in the U.S, Transmile and Megan Media in Malaysia, followed by revelations 
of misrepresentation of financial statements, lead many stakeholders to question the 
effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms on the management. These have drawn 
attention to corporate governance reform around the world and the need to improve 
accounting quality,  as the capital market needs precise and unbiased financial 
reporting to value securities and encourage investors’ confidence (Mahenthiran, 
2008).3  
In response to the risks posed by corporate governance breakdowns, many countries 
have taken a proactive approach in strengthening the corporate governance systems 
currently employed (Hashim and Devi, 2008; Fredersiksson et al., 2012). The main 
focus is to enhance the quality of the board of directors so that shareholders’ interest 
can be better protected, enhancing shareholder value so that they will receive an 
appropriate return based on their investment. In the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2000 (hereafter, MCCG 2000), directors, directors remuneration, 
shareholders, accountability and audit are the four main principles for effective 
corporate governance mechanisms for Malaysian public-listed companies (hereafter, 
companies).  
 
MCCG 2000 recommends that companies have a well-balanced and effective board 
to take the lead role in establishing best practice in corporate governance. A well-
                                                 
3 Transmile Group Bhd overstated its revenue by RM622 million for the years 2004 to 2006 (The Star, 
,2007). Megan Media Holdings Bhd reported a whoppingan enormous net loss of RM1.14 billion for 
the fourth quarter ended 30 April 2007 as a result of accounting fraud at its subsidiary (The Edge, 
2007) 
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11 
balanced board is defined as having a balance of executive directors and non-
executive directors, which including independent non-executive directors, to ensure 
effective decision making by the board with no domination from an individual or 
small groups of individuals (Rahman and Haniffa, 2005; Rahman and Ali, 2006; 
Hashim and Devi, 2008). Additionally, MCCG 2000 also requires non-executive 
directors to have the necessary skills and experience and be a person of calibrecaliber 
and credibility in order to bring independent judgment to the board. 
 
Furthermore, recent changes in the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (Revised 2007) (hereafter, MCCG 2007) are aims aimed at 
strengthening the board of directors and audit committees.4.  MCCG 2007 shows 
greater clarity of the role of nominating a committee that consists exclusively of non-
executive directors, a majority of whom are independent, to recommend candidates 
for directorship.5 MCCG 2007 requires among other factors, the skills, knowledge, 
expertise and experience of candidates so that the appointed directors will be able to 
discharge their functions more effectively (MCCG 2007, Part 2AA, paragraph VIII).  
 
MCCG 2007 also strives to strengthen the role of audit committees by requiring the 
committees to be comprised fully of non-executive directors. In addition, all of the 
audit committee members should be financially literate – by be able to read, 
                                                 
4 An independent audit committee serves to implement and support the oversight function of the board 
in several ways. Such a committee provides a means for a review of the company’s processes for 
producing financial data, its internal controls, and the independence of the company’s external auditor, 
and a forum for dialogue with the company’s external and internal auditors. (Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance 2000, p.44) 
 
5  MCCG 2007 places importance on the process carried out by the nominating committee in 
evaluating members of the board, including the independent non-executive directors and chief 
executive officer. A nominating committee should also ensure that its assessments and evaluations are 
properly documented (MCCG 2007 Part 2AA, paragraph X) 
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analyseanalyze and interpret financial statements – so that they will be able to 
effectively discharge their functions (MCCG 2007 Part 2BB, paragraph I). MCCG 
2007 also increases the frequency of meetings to at least twice a year between the 
audit committee and the external auditor without the executive board members 
present (MCCG 2007, Part 2BB, paragraph III).6  Those key amendments will serve 
to improve to accounting quality.    
 
Although there are is numerousabundant literature on corporate governance issues 
studied in Malaysia, discussion on the relationship between corporate governance 
and accounting quality has not been extensively explored. Other studies in the 
Malaysian context investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance (Abdullah, 2004b; Rahman and Haniffa, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Wahab, How and Verhoeven, 2007), corporate governance and earnings 
management7 (Abdullah, 2004; Rahman and Ali, 2006) and corporate governance 
and audit quality (Yatim, Kent, and Clarkson, 2006; Wahab and James, 2011) and 
non do not examine the relationship between corporate governance and accounting 
quality. Despite the fact there are many prior studies that have investigated the issue 
of earnings management (one of the proxy proxies in accounting quality) and board 
independence (Peasnell et al., 2005; Klein, 2002; Chtourou et al., 2001; and Park and 
                                                                                                                                          
 
6 Furthermore, other amendments included  internal audit function will be mandated for all PLCs, and 
the board of directors will be responsible for ensuring the adherence to the scope of internal audit 
functions  (MCCG 2007 Part 2BB, paragraph VII). 
7  Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as occurring when: Managers use 
judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers 
Earnings management is viewed as having an inverse association with earnings quality (Schipper and 
Vincent 2003): the greater the extent of earnings management, the lower the quality of earnings and 
vice versa. 
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Shin, 2004), CEO duality (Bowen et al., 2010; and Carapeto et al., 2005), board 
competency (Xie et al., 2003; and Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and manager share 
ownership (Gul and Wah, 2002; Kim and Yu, 2006; and Cheng and Warfield, 2010; 
Fredersiksson et al., 2012), only a few studies, such as Mohd Salleh et al. (2008), 
and Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006) have investigated the issue in the 
Malaysian context. This research extends prior research by making an in depth 
investigation between the link between the corporate governance and accounting 
quality. 
 
Motivated by these potential benefits from changes in accounting standards, policy 
concerns on corporate governance, and building on earlier work, as mentioned 
above, the present research addresses the link between corporate governance 
focusing on board structure, expertise8 and effectiveness of audit committee with 
accounting quality. Furthermore, with the implementation of MCCG 2007, firms 
with stronger corporate governance in terms of board structure and audit committee 
will serve as a more effective monitoring mechanism, may lead to a higher increase 
of accounting quality from pre IFRS to post IFRS period. 
 
The importance of adopting of IFRS is that it appears to reduce information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Prior literature finds a reduction of 
information asymmetry, as evidenced by lower earnings management. Barth et al. 
(2010) suggest that accounting quality could be improved with the elimination of 
                                                 
8 This research assigns accounting expertise to audit committee members who currently have (or have 
previously had) work experience as certified public accountants, chief financial officers, vice 
presidents of finance, financial controllers, or any other major accounting position.s 
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alternative accounting methods (as previously used in pre-IFRS period) that are less 
reflective of firm’s performance and are used by managers to manage earnings.   
 
Given that audit committees are the principal liaison between management and 
auditors, and are mainly responsible for reporting on accounting quality to the board 
of directors, this research anticipates that their monitoring performance should 
determine the extent of earnings management by managers. Moreover, the quality of 
the audit committee is fundamentally linked to the quality of the corporate board 
because all audit committee members are also members of the board, and are 
appointed by the board itself, while audit committee decisions have to be ratified by  
the board as a whole (Vafeas, 2005; Frediksson et al., 2012). Accordingly, this 
research also hypothesizes that well-structured and functioning corporate boards are 
associated with improved accounting quality. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
Financial reporting must be done in a way that is relevant and meaningful. It is thus 
incumbent on the accounting profession and regulators like to be vigilant in 
safeguarding the quality of financial information disseminated to investors. In view 
of this, compliance with high accounting quality is an imperative. Information 
derived from the utilisationutilization of high quality accounting standards, in turn, 
instils confidence among public investors public. This contributes to capital 
formation and helps ensure that capital is allocated efficiently in securing long term 
economic growth (Accountant Today, 2007). 
Driven by this motivation, the Malaysian capital market has embraced the new or 
revised FRS issued by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (hereafter, 
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MASB), which become became effective on 1 January 1, 2006.9 The new or revised 
FRS, which are in line with the International Financial Reporting Standards issued by 
IASB, facilitate the convergence of global accounting standards or the birth of a 
common language in accounting standards.  
To further boost the investors’ confidence and improve thed creditability and 
accountability of financial information produces produced by PLCs, the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance, first issued in March 2000, marked a significant 
milestone in corporate governance reform in Malaysia. It codified the principles and 
best practices of good governance and described optimal corporate governance 
structures and internal processes. Since the release of the Code, the Malaysian 
corporate scene has made significant strides in corporate governance standards. The 
mandatory reporting of compliance with the Code has enabled shareholders and the 
public to assess and determine the standards of corporate governance by listed 
companies.  
While significant improvement has been achieved, it is now timely to review the 
Code to further strengthen corporate governance practices in line with developments 
in the domestic and international capital markets. In this respect, the Prime Minister, 
Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had announced in the Budget 2008 speech that 
“the Code is being reviewed to improve the quality of the board of public listed 
companies (PLCs) by putting in place the criteria for qualification of directors and 
strengthening the audit committee, as well as the internal audit function of the 
PLCs….” To ensure the effectiveness of the audit committee of PLCs, executive 
directors will no longer be allowed to become members of the audit committee. 
                                                 
9 To the best of my knowledge, Astro Asia Networks plc is the only company has that voluntary 
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Accordingly, members of the audit committee must ensure high standards of 
financial reporting quality. 
MCCG 2007 just came inwas timely, as 2007 marked a critical year for the 
accounting profession in Malaysia. The high level of negative publicity connected 
with the financial scandals of Transmile and Megan Media has had left little doubt 
that the accounting profession in Malaysia is was facing an accusation crisis. These 
The continuance of such corporate scandals still happening right after the 
implementation of IFRS in Malaysia raised the question:  
“Whether Has our the accounting quality and corporate governance in Malaysia do 
nothas improved at all?”  
These corporate scandals also have again also raised the questions  
“Whether Do do the better governed firms report more credible earnings numbers?” 
Therefore, whether or not the board structure, expertise and effectiveness of audit 
committee, as highlighted in MCCG (2000 and 2007), to ensure compliance with the 
accounting standards, as well as the choice of accounting methods and estimates that 
best reflects the underlying economic events,  and thus improved accounting quality, 
is still an empirical question. Moreover, from studies conducted on in other 
countries, there has been sufficient evidence to conclude that the change in 
accounting standards alone does not ensure an improvement in accounting quality 
(Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Lin et al., 2012).    
This research investigates whether various corporate governance characteristics are 
associated with thefirm’s accounting quality of firms before and after the 
                                                                                                                                          
adopted IFRS before 1 January 1, 2006 in Malaysia.  
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17 
implementation of IFRS. The improvement in accounting quality after the 
implementation of IFRS is also investigated.   
The level of accounting quality could increase due to several reasons. First, actions 
by standard setters limit management’s opportunistic discretion in determining 
accounting amounts, e.g., managing earnings (Barth et al., 2010). Second,   
accounting quality also could also increase because of changes in the financial 
reporting system contemporaneous with the firms’ adoption of IFRS by firms, e.g. 
more rigorous enforcement .(Barth et al., 2010). 
However, according to Barth et al. (2010), there are two reasons why this prediction 
on of an increase in accounting quality may not be borne out. First, IFRS may be of 
lower quality than the MASB standards. For example, limiting managerial discretion 
relating to accounting alternatives could eliminate restrict the firm’s ability to report 
accounting measurements that are more reflective of the firm’s economic position 
and performance. In addition, the inherent flexibility in principles-based standards 
could provide greater opportunity for firms to manage earnings, thereby decreasing 
accounting quality. Second, the effects of features of the financial reporting system 
other than the standards themselves could eliminateeradicate any improvement in 
quality arising from higher quality accounting standards. This could occur, for 
example, if the enforcement of accounting standards is lax. (Barth et al., 2010). 
Therefore, this research will investigate whether the implementation of IFRS is able 
to improve accounting quality in Malaysia. 
Previous research by Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) examines timely loss recognition 
for firms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In these countries, 
accounting standards are largely derived from common law, and, therefore, are likely 
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are similar to the International Accounting Standards (IAS), which is are generally 
viewed as high quality. They find that timely loss recognition for firms in these 
countries is no better than for firms in code law countries, and they attributes this 
findingwhich they attribute to the differing incentives of managers and auditors. 
Therefore, Malaysia will provide a useful setting for testing on the relation between 
accounting standards and accounting quality with a unique institutional setting.s.     
By observation, there is a wide cross-sectional variation in how audit committees and 
boards are structured and operate. Given such variation, the nature of the relation 
between audit committees, board structures and accounting quality is a fundamental 
research question with clear policy implications. The empirical evidence addressing 
this question has been mostly consistent with the view that more appropriately 
structured audit committees and boards produce earnings information of higher 
quality (Vafeas, 2005). 
Furthermore, this is an institutional environment where in which there is both 
considerable accounting discretion and fewer governance regulations (Bradbury, 
Mak, and S.M. Tan, 2004). The accounting standards for Malaysia are based on 
International Accounting Standards, which are less stringent than the US GAAP. 
U.S. GAAP is considered by many to be the most stringent set of accounting 
standards because of the more constrained measurement standards and the number of 
required disclosures relative to IFRS or country-specific accounting principles (Barth 
et al., 2010). Bhattacharya et al. (2003) compares earnings management across 
countries in terms of increasing earnings, negative earnings avoidance and earnings 
smoothing, and report that Malaysia is among the countries with the greatest earnings 
management. Therefore, this research will also investigate whether implementing of 
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IFRS in Malaysia and MCCG 2007 is able to reduce earnings management, and, 
thus, higher accounting quality. 
1.3 Research Objectives          
As mentioned, adopting IFRS appears to reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders  Prior literature  finds a reduction of information 
asymmetry as evidenced by lower earnings management, lower costs of capital and 
lower forecast errors (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007).  Barth et al. (2010) suggest that 
accounting quality could be improved with the elimination of alternative accounting 
methods that are less reflective of firms’ performance and are used by managers to 
manage earnings. They compare earnings management for firms that voluntarily 
switch to IFRS with firms that use domestic accounting standards. They find that 
after IFRS adoption, firms have lower frequency of small positive net income, and 
higher frequency of large losses. 
Therefore, the main objective of this research is to examine the changes in 
accounting quality before, and after the implementation of FRS on 1 January 1, 2006, 
To be more specific, this research is will examine and compare the accounting 
quality reporting under MASB standards from 2003 to 2005 (pre IFRS period), FRS 
in 2006 (mandatory IFRS period) and 2007 plus 2008 (post IFRS period). This 
research focuses on accounting quality because investors obviously need accurate 
and reliable accounting information to make investment decisions, and higher 
accounting quality enhances investment efficiency by reducing information 
asymmetry (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Chang and Sun, 2009; Samarasekera et al., 
2012).      
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Furthermore, the passage of MCCG 2007 marks the improvement in the quality of 
the board by putting in place the criteria for the qualification of directors, 
strengthening the audit committee and other corporate governance functions. With 
thisAccordingly, MCCG 2007 should improve firms’ corporate governance functions 
in monitoring the accounting quality.  Therefore, this research will investigate is if 
there any impact by MCCG 2007 (using data from 2006 to 2008) had any impact on 
accounting quality.  
This research examines the relationship between various governance mechanisms of 
board structure, audit committees and accounting quality in Malaysia. Therefore, the 
other objective of this research is to investigate whether various corporate 
governance characteristics are associated with the accounting quality of firms’s 
accounting quality before and after the implementation of FRS, which are converged 
/ in line with IFRS. To cConsistent with the above research objectives, the specific 
research objectives are set as follows: 
 
 
1. To examine the level of accounting quality in the period prior and leading to the 
implementation of IFRS. 
2. To investigate the relationship between board structure (in the pre and post 
MCCG 2007) and accounting quality in the period prior and leading to IFRS 
implementation. 
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.), Highlight
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Comment [JD1]: not sure how this relates to rest 
of sentence as it reads very awkwardly 
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Formatted: English (U.S.)
21 
3. To investigate the relationship between expertise and effectiveness of audit 
committee (in the pre and post MCCG 2007) and accounting quality in the period 
prior and leading to IFRS implementation.  
In this research, the board structure and composition include: type of expertise, 
independence, board size, directors’ ownership and role duality.  Whereas for 
expertise and effectiveness of audit committee include: quality of financial expertise, 
proportion of members with financial expertise, independence, size and number of 
meetings. In addition, according to the corporate governance and financial reporting 
literature, the corporate governance structures and accounting quality may be 
affected ownership structure. Thus, institutional investors, bumipurta shareholders 
and foreign shareholders will serve as an additional governance mechanism on this 
research. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
Undoubtedly, the transition to IFRS represents one of the biggest challenges to 
Malaysian reporting entities, especially issues relating to the changeover, which must 
be confronted to ensure that during the transition period continued integrity of the 
financial reporting process is maintained. (Lazar et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2012) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers senior executive director and corporate reporting leader, Ng 
Mi Li (2005), said the new rules would result in greater volatility of company results, 
changes in the presentation of financial statements and also a greater need for 
specialist valuers. According to Stephen Ong (2005), Ernst and Young technical 
partner, the biggest impact on listed firms would come from FRS 139, 140, 2 and 3. 
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Companies must therefore fully understand fully the new requirements and be 
comfortable about their impact before attempting to communicate their effects. Thus, 
ignoring or understanding the issues involved in changing from MASB to FRS, that 
could have serious negative consequences for the firm, as companies that have not 
yet engaged in the transition process could face a significant challenge to meet not 
only their reporting deadlines and high reporting quality, but also the financial effects 
on the company share prices. 
Given the problem statement and research objective described in the preceding 
section, this research attempts to investigate whether the application of IFRS in 
Malaysia after 1 January 1, 2006 and  MCCG 2007 which take took effect on 1 
October 1, 2007 is associated with higher accounting quality than the application of 
MASB standards. Specifically, the following research questions have been 
developed: 
1. Whether Is there is a difference in the level of accounting quality in the 
period prior and leading to the implementation of IFRS? 
2. Whether Does board structure (in the pre and post MCCG 2007) has have an 
influence on accounting quality in the period prior and leading to IFRS 
implementation? 
3. Whether Do expertise and effectiveness of audit committees (in the pre and 
post MCCG 2007) have an influence on accounting quality in the period prior 
and leading to IFRS implementation?  
 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
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This research contributes to the literature on concerning the association between 
corporate governance and accounting quality in several ways. First, while most prior 
studies on board of director’s’ characteristics mainly focus mainly on the role of 
board independence, this paper also examines their expertise to effectively monitor 
the financial reporting process. Although MCCG 2007 does not state specifically the 
criteria for skills and expertise, this research attempts to gather evidence through 
various proxies of for expertise, such as financial expertise, governance expertise and 
firm-specific expertise. Therefore, bBoard expertise and accounting quality are 
currently very topical issues. 
Secondly, by including of more recent data and investigate investigating the effects 
of the mandatory adoption of FRS since 2006 on accounting quality. Prior research 
has shown that Malaysia has accounting standards that are generally viewed as high 
quality, but due to institutional structures that give preparers have an incentives to 
issue low quality financial reports (Ball et al., 2003). 
Thirdly, this research contributes to our understanding about corporate governance 
characteristics that are effective to in minimize minimizing agency costs in an East 
Asian country like Malaysia. This research uses Malaysia as the setting because the 
country has a pyramidal, concentrated and dominated by family ownership structure 
(Claessens et al., 2000). It also has relatively weak legal protection for in minority 
shareholders legal protection compared to developed nations (La Porta et al., 2000), 
stronger political connections (Johnson and Mittion, 2003; Gul, 2006), and 
government ownership in publicly listed companies (Mak and Li, 2001; Dogan and 
Smyth, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Additionally, company directors in Malaysia 
are not as independent as those in developed countries (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). 
Some observe that Big 4 firms operate in Malaysia (through link-ups with local 
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firms), but however, there has been no litigation against auditors within Malaysia 
(Johl, et al., 2007)  This background provides a stronger incentives for the 
management to expropriate minority shareholder’s wealth in Malaysian firms 
compared to their counterparts in more developed nations. However, Mitton (2002) 
suggests that in the case of weak legal protection for minority interests, corporate 
governance becomes one of the important mechanisms to preclude expropriation of 
wealth. Therefore, this research fills a gap in the literature by investigating whether 
corporate governance plays its role that in satisfies satisfying the expectation of 
minority shareholders in a country with inadequate legal protection. The following 
section will discuss the theoretical and practical contributions. 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical contribution   
From the perspective of theory development or theoretical contribution, this research 
will contribute to the literature examining the quality of IFRS- based accounting 
amounts in three ways.  First, this research uses a broad sample of firms listed 
companies listed on the main board,  of Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur over several 
years. In contrast, there is a lack of prior research focus on an emerging market like 
Malaysia but as typically the focus ises on individual developed countries like the 
UK and the US. Furthermore, the mandatory nature of change across all public listed 
companies removes any sample selection biases. 
 
Secondly, most of the prior studies only used only cross-sectional data in their 
analysis of board structure, audit committees and accounting quality. Such tests 
potentially encounter the problem of omitted variables associated with board 
structure, audit committees and accounting quality. This research sought to overcome 
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